The United States has important economic, commercial, and security
interests in Indonesia. It remains a linchpin of regional security due to its strategic
location astride a number of key international maritime straits
The United States views Indonesia as the cornerstone of regional security in Southeast Asia and a key trade
partner. U.S. interests in the region depend on Indonesia's stability and economic growth.
Indonesia's path to peace and prosperity leads only through democracy, the United States believes. Although establishing
lasting democratic institutions in a country as large and
diverse as Indonesia may entail many initial struggles, it is the best way to ensure that government makes its
decisions based on the interests of the people, not just the interests
of the leaders.
The United States considers Indonesia a valued friend in Asia and supports its efforts to recover its national
balance. Indonesia's success will enhance security and economic recovery in the entire Southeast Asian region.
The United States strongly supports Indonesia's political reforms and pledges its cooperation and assistance as
the process of change continues so that the world's fourth largest nation can make permanent its status as the
largest democracy in
East Asia, and the third largest democracy in the world.
EDITOR'S NOTE
There is an abundance of publications, articles, books, analyses available on the
Sukarno Years. Each of course reflects the writer's individual interpretation of events, personal views, knowledge
and biases, instances, where objectivity can be impacted by pro or anti-Sukarno feelings, pro or anti-western outlook,
usually not taking into account the Indonesian standpoint, the opinion of the Indonesian people at large and interpreting
the course of events based on their own behavioural standards and principles.
The Sukarno Presidency was part of the Cold War conflict.
US Policy was aimed at protecting their own anti-communist interests in the Cold War. A country like Indonesia,
strategically located, considered important for the Western effort to fight communism was designated to be on the
US side. Sukarno's neutralism placed him on the wrong side of the US government. US policies were and are still
dominated by the principle that you are either pro or anti the US and it is the obligation of the US to bring you
to the right side, the US side, no middle way, no neutralism accepted.
The Cold War struggle impacted the early years of independence as western nations did
not hesitate to resort to pressure, manipulative and treacherous actions to make Sukarno bow down to their demand
that he become a Western ally, side with them, the all-powerful West. His refusal to do so and insistence on neutralism
resulted in unabated treacherous western actions, led by the US and the UK to bring him down as president, falsely
proclaiming him a communist because of his stand for nationalism and neutralism.
A thorn in their eyes, they finally succeeded in 1967 with his removal and replacement by a staunch "Cold
War Ally".
The western press and media were not objective observers. Their reports were biased towards
the west, criticizing Sukarno whenever possible even to the extent of helping create a distorted picture. Their
biased reporting was based on the western viewpoint and mostly ignored the ambitions, traditions, philosophies,
way of thinking and feelings of the Indonesian people at large.
Anything that did not conform to their own standards was wrong. Their powerful disrtibution channels very much
helped to create a distorted picture of Sukarno, playing down his strengths and achievements, heavily emphasizing
his personal weaknesses.
Sukarno was a president brought down by western powers and their media channels.
Many quotations and summaries will appear on, or are linked to this website, reflecting
the respective writer's individual opinions, interpretations and analyses.
The reader will draw his/her own conclusions on the diversified stories.
White House, 6 October 1960
President Sukarno discusses the resolution of 5 non-aligned countries
proposing an Eisenhower Khrushchev meeting to reduce world tensions.
In Sukarno's words:
I am often asked about my alleged anti-Americanism.
Over the years I have desperately wanted to be
America's friend, but she wouldn't let me. She repeatedly mistakes foreign aid for friendship
(quoted from "Sukarno: An Autobiography "
by Cindy Adams page 295):
Indonesia-US relations were heavily impacted by the Cold War struggle
between the US and Soviet Union. The US wanted Indonesia as an ally and resented
Sukarno's independent attitude. Starting with aggressive operations by theCIAduring the Eisenhower years, followed by JFK's
diplomatic strategies, unabated US efforts continued to win over Indonesia , attempting Sukarno's downfall in one
way or another, and put in place a successor more willing to side with them.
84th Congress
President Soekarno told Congress that the United States
must recognize nationalism and anti-colonialism as the
mainspring of Asian and African governments or see
American aid create only bitterness and disappointment.
Washington DC, May 17, 1956
Sukarno addresses a joint session of 84th Congress:
..... "Nationalism
may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in the world; for us of
Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Fail to understand it, and no amount
of thinking, no torrent of words, no Niagara of dollars will produce anything but bitterness
and disillusionment. We of Indonesia are in the stage of national turmoil through which
America passed some 150 years ago. We ask you to understand."
Sukarno before one of the largest crowds of newsmen
ever to jam the National Press Club's ballroom:
...... "We
are not anti-West.
The object of our policy is the same as the object
of your policy: to seek a larger freedom for mankind.
But there may well be more than one road to final consummation of such a policy."
President Eisenhower, in welcoming him at the
White House, stressed the parallel problem of
the two nations and remarked:
"There are always anti-democratic nations ready to
step on our face, but I believe that friendship is
always stronger than jealousies and hatreds"
1958
US Navy AJ-2P Savage plane hit by Permesta anti-aircraft fire over Manado
"No wonder Sukarno doesn't like us very
much.
He has to sit down with people who tried
to overthrow him."
1962
February 1962 Robert F. Kennedy visits Indonesia to try to persuade Sukarno to resolve
the West Irian dispute with the Netherlands.
This followed Soekarno's indication that he would release Allen Pope, the US pilot captured and sentenced to death for his role in the bombing of Ambon durring
the Permesta rebellion.
With US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as mediator secret talks between the two countries
were held late March 1962. After a stalemate an agreement was finally reached for the release of West New Guinea
to Indonesia, signed by both parties at the United Nations on August 15, 1962.
May 1, 1963 West New Guinea officially became part of the
Republic of Indonesia.
President Johnson increasingly focused on the American military effort in Vietnam. He firmly believed in the
Domino Theory and that his containment policy required America to make a serious effort to stop all Communist expansion.
At Kennedy's death, there were 16,000 American military advisors in Vietnam. Johnson expanded their numbers and
roles following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (less than three weeks after the Republican Convention of 1964, which
had nominated Barry Goldwater for President).
"Our aid
to Indonesia. . is not helping Indonesia militarily.
It is, however, permitting us to maintain some contact with
key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and
capable of resisting Communist takeover. We think this
is of vital importance to the entire Free World."
1965
April 6, 1965
US Special Envoy Ellsworth Bunker and
Ambasssador Howard Jones meet
President Sukarno in an effort to
improve declining US Indonesian relations
Sukarno distrusted Ambassador Marshal Green
because of his alleged CIA background , delaying approval
of his ambassadorial appointment for several months.
Concerned about Sukarno's political direction and the
powerful Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), President Eisenhower ordered the CIA to foment a coup in 1958. The coup failed, but its planning linked the CIA and
Pentagon with Suharto and other Indonesian military
officers who saw an opening to power.
Marshall Green, was US Ambassador in Indonesia
July 26, 1965 - March 25, 1969
1966
After President Suharto took office US-Indonesia relations improved tremendously
and US investment grew as never before. Almost overnight the Indonesian government went from being a fierce voice for cold
war neutrality and anti-imperialism to a quiet, compliant partner of the U.S. world
order.
US Embassy Jakarta was established Dec 27, 1949
U.S. Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission/Ambassador
to Indonesia (Sukarno years)
H. Merle Cochran ( Dec 30, 1949 - Feb 27, 1953)
Hugh Smith Cumming, Jr. (Sep 3, 1953 - Mar 3, 1957)
John M. Allison ( Mar 13, 1957- Jan 29, 1958)
Howard Palfrey Jones ( Feb 20, 1958- May 24, 1965)
Marshall Green ( Jul 26, 1965- Mar 26, 1969)
Inauguration President Obama Jan 20, 2009
Live Video Coverage
In his speeches President Obama reminds me of President Sukarno of Indonesia:
Reflecting the same mesmerizing magic bond with the people, the same idealism and patriotism
His political outlook in a capsule:
"To me, both the Declaration Of Independence and the Communist
Manifesto
contain underlying truths, but the West doesn't permit a middle road.
They manipulate you so you are no longer able to stay independent.
To President Roosevelts four freedoms I add a fifth: The freedom to be free!
The West keeps threatening: "Do you want to be dominated by the Communists?"
We answer: "No....but neither do we want to be dominated by you!"
At least Russia and China did not call us names when we smiled sweetly at America. A nation engaged in surviving must take help from all
sides, accept whatever is useful and throw away the rest.
From "Sukarno-An Autobiography"
by Cindy Adams (page 294)
Introduction by Editor
The US is intricately involved in the birth of the Republic of Indonesia. It was
instrumental in convincing the Dutch to recognize Indonesia's
independence (1949). Later it played a decisive role in the Dutch release
of West-Irian to Indonesia(1962). It played a questionable role in the downfall of Sukarno and his replacement by Suharto,
a staunch Western supporter who facilitated/opened thus far closed opportunities to the US and its allies.
This support was, of course, politically motivated.
The US needed Indonesia because of its strategic
importance, its strategic location at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific
Ocean, its importance as a bulwark against communism during the cold war, its valuable oil, minerals and natural
resources.
As long as Indonesia played by the rules, i.e. sided with the US, there were no
problems. When Sukarno developed an independent streak, promoted a deep sense of nationalism over western imperialism,
preferred guided democracy over western democracy, became a forefighter of non-alignment, theCIA started plotting
attempts in the 1950'sto dethrone Sukarno as described in this website's selection of reports and articles. This ultimately
led to his downfall after the socalled 1965 Gestapu
affair and his replacement by General Suharto, a staunch US supporter.
Sukarno promoted guided
democracy because he felt that his people, the majority uneducated or with
a low
educational level (after 350 years of Dutch colonialism which had provided limited educational opportunities) were
not yet ready for western democracy. He disliked the western product commercials advocating consumerism and
forbade such commercial product advertising on Radio and TV, considering it a negative commercial influence on
the people in this stage of the country's development.
The West depicted him as a communist and used this as a stepping stone to blacken
his image and justification
for continuous efforts to de-throne and replace him with a person more sympathetic to their political needs and
requirements who could "significantly enhance the
US military position in Asia"
Aid was used as a weapon to chain relations. Aid was often depicted as a benefit to
the receiving party (and it undoubtedly was), but no exposure was given to the fact that aid was also very beneficial
for the donor country.
Aid funds were usually tied to donor country supplies and services or related to political motives and strategies.
Aid to Indonesia was not welfare. Aside from political motivations it was a 2-way street benefiting both Indonesia
and the donor country's economy and industry. The most important objective of Western aid efforts was to keep Indonesia
from becoming communist.
The following January
22, 1965 statementof President
Johnson
onmilitary aid is
a clear reflection of the purpose of US aid
(military or otherwise):
" all U.S. military assistance going to Indonesia is being provided
because it is inour national interest, not theirs. "
The above Statement underlines the motives behind aid, serving the interests of the provider,
not necessarily the interests of the receiving party.
Indonesia was strategically important.
The CIA believed Sukarno was opening up the country to commnism
The CIA proposed a program of black operations of covert propaganda that was disseminated through Indonesian
newspapers, political parties and the Indonesian Army that attempted to raise the specter of a looming Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) takeover of the Indonesian government.
The CIA made a bizarre decision by making the world's first celebrity porn film. They hired a Sukarno look-alike
and filmed him enjoying the company of a young lady who was'nt his wife. However, this movie had no impact on his
popularity.
So when this attempt failed, the CIA turned to something a lot less funny: Black Operatons.
Black Operations are top secret or illegal missions which the CIA performs for the US government.that
are not supposed
to come out in the open
IThe serious covert operation was aimed at creating confusion in Indonesian society so as to provoke an armed
clash between the Indonesian army and the Indonesia communist party which the CIA fully anticipated would result
in a blood
bath and allow for a military take over of the Indonesian government.
On the night of September 30th 1965 a low-ranking soldier kindnapped and murdered six Indonesian generals.
The soldier claimed that he carried out this attack to prevent the generals taking over the country in a CIA sponsored
coup.
In the confision that followed these murders General suharto and his army blamed the Indonesian Communist party
(PKI)
and mounted a coup to get rid of President Sukarno.
The CIA had got what they wanted and sukarno was driven from power.
After the coup the CIA worked together with the generals to ensure every single communist in Indonesia killed.
They gave the government of Indonesia a list of citizens who are communist.
This list was used by the government after the coup to start a massacre. A massacre which took the lives of between
half a million to a million people.
The United States Government led but the central Intelligence Agency helped to facilitate this massacre by providing
various forms of communication equipment, money and small weapons to the Indonesian army.
This campaign constituted one of the greatest campaigns of slaughter in modern Asian History.
It is one of the most troubling episodes in the history of American foreign policy.
WASHINGTON, July 27 — A supposedly secret State Department history, released today by a private research group,
discloses new details of United States policy during the 1965 campaign by the Indonesian Army to wipe out the Communist
opposition in Indonesia.
The National Security Archive, a Washington group that pushes for the declassification of government documents,
obtained a copy of an official State Department history that describes American policy in Indonesia in the mid-1960's.
Tom Blanton, the archive's director, said that the history had been completed for some time, but that its release
had been blocked by the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Mr. Blanton's group obtained a copy
of the history when copies were inadvertently sent by the Government Printing Office to G.P.O. bookstores before
they were supposed to be released.
Mark Mansfield, a spokesman for the C.I.A., said an interagency decision to delay the publication had been made
to avoid roiling relations at a time of political turmoil in Indonesia. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of
Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, who was ousted after being undermined by the campaign, became the country's
leader this week; she replaced Abdurrahman Wahid, who was forced out of office.
Mr. Mansfield said the shipment to government bookstores was accidental.
The history includes documents about American actions during the Indonesian Army's campaign against the Indonesia
Communist Party, or P.K.I., in 1965 and 1966. The campaign brought General Suharto to power as the country's dictator,
replacing President Sukarno.
In an editorial note, the history describes in detail the difficulty that the United States Embassy in Jakarta
had in keeping up with events during the chaotic period.
"The embassy . . . was hampered in its reporting on events in the areas outside the capital by the general
confusion and chaos," the history states. "Gradually, the embassy came to realize that Indonesia was
undergoing a full-scale purge of P.K.I. influence and that these killings were overlaid with longstanding and deep
ethnic and religious conflicts."
The history also includes a Dec. 2, 1965, telegram from Ambassador Marshall Green to the State Department concerning
possible American payments to a man described in the memo as "one of the key civilian advisers and promoters"
of an organization known as the Kap-Gestapu movement. The memo added that Kap-Gestapu's activities were "fully
consonant with and coordinated by the army."
The National Security Archive said the Kap-Gestapu movement had been involved in the army-backed campaign against
the Communists.
The memo from the ambassador supported the payment in order to increase the man's standing in the Kap-Gestapu movement.
"The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black
bag operation can be," it stated.
US officials at the time called a “reign of terror” and British officials “ruthless terror”. However, unlike the
terrorists responsible for the outrage of September 11, precisely nothing has ever been done to bring those responsible
in Indonesia – and their supporters in Washington and London - to account.
The killings in Indonesia started when a group of army officers loyal to President Sukarno assassinated several
generals on 30 September 1965. They believed the generals were about to stage a coup to overthrow Sukarno. The
instability, however, provided other anti-Sukarno generals, led by General Suharto, with an excuse for the army
to move against a powerful and popular political faction with mass support, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
It did so brutally: in a few months hundreds of thousands of PKI members and ordinary people were killed and the
PKI destroyed. Suharto emerged as leader and instituted a repressive regime that lasted until 1998.
The declassified documents show five ways in which the US and Britain were complicit
in this slaughter. First, both the US and Britain wanted the army to act and encouraged them to do it. US officials
expressed their hope of “army at long last to act effectively against Communists” [sic]. “We are, as always, sympathetic
to army’s desire to eliminate communist influence” and ”it is important to assure the army of our full support
of its efforts to crush the PKI”, other officials noted.
The British were equally enthusiastic. “I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia
would be an essential preliminary to effective change”, the ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, informed
the Foreign Office on 5 October.
The following day the Foreign Office in London stated that “the crucial question still remains whether the Generals
will pluck up enough courage to take decisive action against the PKI”. Later it noted that “we must surely prefer
an Army to a Communist regime” and declared: “It seems pretty clear that the Generals are going to need all the
help they can get and accept without being tagged as hopelessly pro-Western, if they are going to be able to gain
ascendancy over the Communists. In the short run, and while the present confusion continues, we can hardly go wrong
by tacitly backing the Generals”. British policy was “to encourage the emergence of a General’s regime”, one intelligence
official explained.
Support for army actions continued throughout the period of the worst killings; there is
no question that US and British officials knew exactly what they were supporting. US Ambassador Marshall Green
noted three weeks after the attempted coup and with the killings having begun, that “Army has… been working hard
at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organisation in carrying out
this crucial assignment”. Green noted in the same despatch the “execution of PKI cadres”, putting the figure at
“several hundred of them” in “Djakarta area alone” [sic]. “To date, army has performed far better than anticipated
in attacking PKI and regrouping”.
On 1 November, Green informed the State Department of the army’s “moving relentlessly to exterminate the PKI as
far as that is possible to do”. Three days later he noted that “Embassy and USG generally sympathetic with and
admiring of what army doing” [sic]. Four days after this the US Embassy reported that the Army and allied elements
“has continued systematic drive to destroy PKI in northern Sumatra with wholesale killings reported”.
By 16 November, the US Consulate in Medan was reporting that “much indiscriminate killing is taking place”. “Something
like a reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully between PKI
leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party”. A British official reported on 25 November
that “PKI men and women are being executed in very large numbers”.
By mid December the State Department noted approvingly that “Indonesian military leaders’ campaign to destroy PKI
is moving fairly swiftly and smoothly”. By 14 February 1966 Ambassador Green could note that “the PKI has been
destroyed as an effective political force for some time to come” and that “the Communists…have been decimated by
wholesale massacre”.
The British files reveal that by January the US estimated the number of dead at 150,000, although one Indonesian
armed forces liaison officer told US attaches of a figure of 500,000. By March one British official wondered “how
much of it [the PKI] is left, after six months of killing” and believed that over 200,000 had been killed in Sumatra
alone. By April, the US Embassy stated that “we frankly do not know whether the real figure is closer to 100,000
or 1,000,000 but believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates, especially when questioned by the
press”.
Summarising the events of 1965 the British Consul in Medan referred to the army by noting that: “Posing as saviours
of the nation from a communist terror, they unleashed a ruthless terror of their own, the scare of which will take
many years to heal.” Another British memo referred to the “an operation carried out on a very large scale and often
with appalling savagery”. Another simply referred to the “bloodbath”.
The US and British files reveal total support for these massacres. I could find no reference to any concern about
the extent of killing at all - other than constant encouragement for the army to continue. And it was not only
PKI activists who were the targets of this terror. As the British files show, many of the victims were the “merest
rank and file “ of the PKI who were “often no more than bewildered peasants who give the wrong answer on a dark
night to bloodthirsty hooligans bent on violence”, with the connivance of the army.
The second way in the US and Britain supported the slaughter concerned the “Confrontation” between Malaya and Indonesia.
Here, Britain had deployed tens of thousands troops, mainly in Borneo, to defend Malaya against possible Indonesian
encroachments following territorial claims. British policy “did not want to distract the Indonesian army by getting
them engaged in fighting in Borneo and so discourage them from the attempts which they now seem to be making to
deal with the PKI”. British Ambassador Gilchrist proposed that “we should get word to the Generals that we shall
not attack them whilst they are chasing the PKI”, described as a “necessary task”. In October the British passed
to the Generals, through a US contact “a carefully phrased oral message about not biting the Generals in the back
for the present”.
The US files confirm that the message from the US, conveyed on 14 October, read: “First, we wish to assure you
that we have no intention of interfering Indonesian internal affairs directly or indirectly. Second, we have good
reason to believe that none of our allies intend to initiate any offensive action against Indonesia” [sic]. The
message was greatly welcomed by the army: One of the Indonesian Defence Minister’s aides noted that “this was just
what was needed by way of assurances that we (the army) weren’t going to be hit from all angles as we moved to
straighten things out here”.
Third is the “hit list” of targets supplied by the US to the Indonesian army. As the journalist Kathy Kadane has
revealed, as many as 5,000 names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members and leaders of the mass
organisations of the PKI, such as the national labour federation, women’s and youth groups, were passed on the
Generals, many of whom were subsequently killed. “It really was a big help to the army” noted Robert Martens, a
former member of the US embassy. “They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my
hands, but that’s not all bad. There’s a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment”.
The declassified US files do not provide many further
details about the provision of this hit list, although they
do confirm it. One list of names, for example, was passed to the Indonesians in December 1965 and “is apparently
being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership
at the time”. It also notes that “lists of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were also
provided to GOI [Government of Indonesia] officials at their request”.
The fourth means of support was propaganda operations. On 5 October a “political adviser” at the British intelligence
base in Singapore reported to the Foreign Office in London that: “we should not miss the present opportunity to
use the situation to our advantage… I recommend that we should have no hesitation in doing what we can surreptitiously
to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia”. The Foreign Office replied: “We certainly
do not exclude any unattributable propaganda or psywar [psychological warfare] activities which would contribute
to weakening the PKI permanently. We therefore agree with the [above] recommendation… Suitable propaganda themes
might be… Chinese interference in particular arms shipments; PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign communists”.
On 9 October the political adviser confirmed that “we have made arrangements for distribution of certain unattributable
material based on the general guidance” in the Foreign Office memo. This involved “promoting and coordinating publicity”
critical of the Sukarno government to “news agencies, newspapers and radio”. “The impact has been considerable”,
one file notes.
The fifth means of support was provision of equipment - although this remains the murkiest area to uncover. Past
US support to the military “should have established clearly in minds Army leaders that US stands behind them if
they should need help”, the State Department noted. US strategy was to “avoid overt involvement in the power struggle
but… indicate, clearly but covertly, to key Army officers our desire to assist where we can.”
The first US supplies to the Indonesian army were radio equipment “to help in internal security” and to help the
Generals “in their task of overcoming the Communists”, as British Ambassador Gilchrist out it. The US historian
Gabriel Kolko has shown that in early November 1965 the US received a request from the Generals to “arm Moslem
and nationalist youths…for use against the PKI”. The recently published files confirm this approach from the Indonesians.
On 1 November Ambassador Green cabled Washington that “as to the provision of small arms I would be leery about
telling army we are in position to provide same, although we should act, not close our minds to this possibility…
We could explore availability of small arms stocks, preferable of non-US origin, which could be obtained without
any overt US government involvement. We might also examine channels through which we could, if necessary, provide
covert assistance to army for purchase
of weapons”.
A CIA memo of 9 November stated that the US should avoid being “too hesitant about the propriety of extending such
assistance provided we can do so covertly, in a manner which will not embarrass them or embarrass our government”.
It then noted that mechanisms exist or can be created to deliver “any of the types of the materiel requested to
date in reasonable quantities”. One line of text is then not declassified before the memo notes: “The same can
be said of purchasers and transfer agents for such items as small arms, medicine and other items requested.” The
memo goes on to note that “we do not propose that the Indonesian army be furnished such equipment at this time”.
However, “if the Army leaders justify their needs in detail…it is likely that at least will help ensure their success
and provide the basis for future collaboration with the US”. “The means for covert implementation” for the delivery
of arms “are within our capabilities”.
In response to the Indonesia request for arms, Kolko has shown that the US promised to provide such covert aid,
and dubbed them “medicines”. The declassified files state that “the Army really needed the medicines” and that
the US was keen to indicate “approval in a practical way of the actions of the Indonesian army”. The extent of
arms provided is not revealed in the files but the amount “the medicines would cost was a mere pittance compared
with the advantages that might accrue to the US as a result of ‘getting in on the ground floor’”, one file reads.
A meeting in Washington of 4 December approved the provision of such “medicines”.
The British knew of these arms supplies and it is likely they also approved them. Britain was initially reluctant
to see
US equipment go to the Generals lest it be used in the “Confrontation”. Thus the British files show that the US
State Department had “undertaken to consult with us before they do anything to support the Generals”. It is possible
that the US reneged on this commitment; however, in earlier discussions about this possibility, a British official
at the embassy
in Washington noted that “I do not think that is very likely”.
The British files in particular show very close relations between the US and British embassies in Jakarta.
They point to a somewhat coordinated joint US-UK operation to help install a Generals regime and bring
bout a government more favourable to Western economic and political interests.
The Indonesia campaign is one of the most bloody in the postwar history of US-UK collaboration that includes the
joint overthrow of the Musaddiq regime in Iran in 1953, the removal of the population of the British island of
Diego Garcia to make way for a US military base in 1965, UK support for US aggression in Vietnam, Central America,
Grenada,
Panama and Libya and covert operations in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The current phase of the special relationship
is witnessed in joint military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Basic US and British concerns and priorities regarding mid-1960s Indonesia are laid out in the files. For the British
the importance of Southeast Asia was partly explained by the fact that “Southeast Asia is a major producer of some
essential commodities” such as rubber, copra and chromuim ore. “Economically, Southeast Asia is a major producer
of raw materials… and the defence of the sources of these products and their denial to a possible enemy are major
interests to the Western powers”. Indonesia also “occupies a key position in world communications”,
straddling
important sea and air routes. And Britain wanted, of course, to see a change in regime in Jakarta to bring an end
to
the “Confrontation” with Malaya.
British Foreign Secretary Michel Stewart wrote at the time that “it is only the economic chaos of Indonesia which
prevents that country from offering great potential opportunities to British exporters. If there is going to be
a deal in Indonesia… I think we ought to take an act and try to secure a slice of the cake ourselves”. The British
feared “the resurgence of Communist and radical nationalism”.
For the US, Under Secretary of State George Ball had noted that Indonesia “may be
more important to us than South V-N [Vietnam]” (251). “At stake”, one US memo read,
“are 100 million people, vast potential resources and a strategically important chain of islands”.
Basic US priorities were virtually identical in Vietnam and Indonesia: to prevent the consolidation of an independent
nationalist regime, with communist components and sympathies, that threatened Western economic and political interests
and that could act as
a successful development model.
The US Ambassador in Malaysia cabled Washington a year before the October 1965 events in Indonesia saying that
“our difficulties with Indonesia stem basically from deliberate, positive GOI [Government of Indonesia] strategy
of seeking to push Britain and the US out of Southeast Asia”. Ball noted in March 1965 that “our relations with
Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart”. “Not only has the management of the American rubber plants been taken
over, but there are dangers of an imminent seizure of the American oil companies”.
The Sukarno regime clearly had the wrong priorities. According to one US report: “the government occupies a dominant
position in basic industry, public utilities, internal transportation and communication”. “It is probable that
private ownership will disappear and may be succeeded by some form of production-profit-sharing contract arrangements
to be applied to all foreign in vestment”. Overall, “the avowed Indonesian objective is ‘to stand on their own
feet’ in developing their economy, free from foreign, especially Western, influence” – clearly all heretical priorities
to basic US-UK strategy that – as today - needed to be defeated.
The problem with the PKI was not so much its communism but its nationalism: “it is likely that PKI foreign policy
decisions, like those of Sukarno, would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking, Moscow or international
communism in general”, one memo reads. The real danger of a Communist Indonesia was outlined in a Special National
Intelligence Estimate of 1 September 1965. This referred to the PKI’s moving “to energize and unite the Indonesia
nation” and stated that “if these efforts succeeded, Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped
world and hence a credit to communism and a setback for Western prestige”. The problem was that Indonesia would
be too successful, a fear in the minds of US planners well documented by Kolko and Noam Chomsky in policy towards
numerous other countries.
The Army was by no means the perfect ally of the US in Indonesia – as the files note, it “was strongly nationalist
in orientation and strongly favours the takeover of Western economic interests”. Nevertheless in
the choice between Sukarno and the PKI on the one hand and the army on the other, “the army deserves our support”.
And over time a combination of Western advice, aid and investment did transform the Indonesian economy into one
that, although retaining an important nationalist element, provided substantial opportunities and profits for Western
investors, aided by an increasingly corrupt President Suharto. The West supported Suharto throughout the three-decade
long rule of repression, including in the regime’s murderous policies in East Timor after the invasion of 1975.
The hundreds of thousands of deaths then were as irrelevant to US and British officials as those in 1965.
Note: The US files referred to were published last year in the Foreign Relations of the United States series
by the US Government Printing Office. British files are in Public Record Office, London.
By 1965 Indonesia had become a dangerous cockpit of social and political antagonisms. The PKI's rapid growth aroused
the hostility of Islamic groups and the military. The ABRI-PKI balancing act, which supported Sukarno's Guided
Democracy regime, was going awry. One of the most serious points of contention was the PKI's desire to establish
a "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers in conjunction with the four branches of the regular armed
forces. Many officers were bitterly hostile, especially after Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered to supply the
"fifth force" with arms. By 1965 ABRI's highest ranks were divided into factions supporting Sukarno and
the PKI and those opposed, the latter including ABRI chief of staff Nasution and Major General Suharto, commander
of Kostrad. Sukarno's collapse at a speech and rumors that he was dying also added to the atmosphere of instability.
The circumstances surrounding the abortive coup d'état of September 30, 1965--an
event that led to Sukarno's displacement from power; a bloody purge of PKI members on Java, Bali, and elsewhere;
and the rise of Suharto as architect of the New Order regime--remain shrouded in mystery and controversy. The official
and generally accepted account is that procommunist military officers, calling themselves the September 30 Movement
(Gestapu), attempted to seize power. Capturing the Indonesian state radio station on October 1, 1965, they announced
that they had formed the Revolutionary Council and a cabinet in order to avert a coup d'état by corrupt
generals who were allegedly in the pay of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The coup perpetrators
murdered five generals on the night of September 30 and fatally wounded Nasution's daughter in an unsuccessful
attempt to assassinate him. Contingents of the Diponegoro Division, based in Jawa Tengah Province, rallied in support
of the September 30 Movement. Communist officials in various parts of Java also expressed their support.
The extent and nature of PKI involvement in the coup are unclear, however. Whereas the official accounts promulgated
by the military describe the communists as having a "puppetmaster" role, some foreign scholars have suggested
that PKI involvement was minimal and that the coup was the result of rivalry between military factions. Although
evidence presented at trials of coup leaders by the military implicated the PKI, the testimony of witnesses may
have been coerced. A pivotal figure seems to have been Syam, head of the PKI's secret operations, who was close
to Aidit and allegedly had fostered close contacts with dissident elements within the military. But one scholar
has suggested that Syam may have been an army agent provocateur who deceived the communist leadership into believing
that sympathetic elements in the ranks were strong enough to conduct a successful bid for power. Another hypothesis
is that Aidit and PKI leaders then in Beijing had seriously miscalculated Sukarno's medical problems and moved
to consolidate their support in the military. Others believe that ironically Sukarno himself was responsible for
masterminding the coup with the cooperation of the PKI.
In a series of papers written after the coup and published in 1971, Cornell University scholars Benedict R.O'G.
Anderson and Ruth T. McVey argued that it was an "internal army affair" and that the PKI was not involved.
There was, they argued, no reason for the PKI to attempt to overthrow the regime when it had been steadily gaining
power on the local level. More radical scenarios allege significant United States involvement. United States military
assistance programs to Indonesia were substantial even during the Guided Democracy period and allegedly were designed
to establish a pro-United States, anticommunist constituency within the armed forces.
In the wake of the September 30 coup's failure, there was a violent anticommunist reaction. By December 1965, mobs
were engaged in large-scale killings, most notably in Jawa Timur Province and on Bali, but also in parts of Sumatra.
Members of Ansor, the Nahdatul Ulama's youth branch, were particularly zealous in carrying out a "holy war"
against the PKI on the village level. Chinese were also targets of mob violence. Estimates of the number killed--both
Chinese and others--vary widely, from a low of 78,000 to 2 million; probably somewhere around 300,000 is most likely.
Whichever figure is true, the elimination of the PKI was the bloodiest event in postwar Southeast Asia until the
Khmer Rouge established its regime in Cambodia a decade later.
The period from October 1965 to March 1966 witnessed the eclipse of Sukarno and the rise of
Suharto to a position of supreme power. Born in the Yogyakarta region in 1921, Suharto came from a lower priyayi
family and received military training in Peta during the Japanese occupation. During the war for independence,
he distinguished himself by leading a lightning attack on Yogyakarta, seizing it on March 1, 1949, after the Dutch
had captured it in their second "police action." Rising quickly through the ranks, he was placed in charge
of the Diponegoro Division in 1962 and Kostrad the following year.
After the elimination of the PKI and purge of the armed forces of pro-Sukarno elements, the president was left
in an isolated, defenseless position. By signing the executive order of March 11, 1966,
Supersemar, he was obliged to transfer supreme authority to Suharto. On March 12, 1967, the MPRS stripped Sukarno
of all political power and installed Suharto as acting president. Sukarno was kept under virtual house arrest,
a lonely and tragic figure, until his death in June 1970.
The year 1966 marked the beginning of dramatic changes in Indonesian foreign policy. Friendly relations were
restored with Western countries, Confrontation with Malaysia ended on August 11, and in September Indonesia rejoined
the UN. In 1967 ties with Beijing were, in the words of Indonesian minister of foreign affairs Adam Malik, "frozen."
This meant that although relations with Beijing were suspended, Jakarta did not seek to establish relations with
the Republic of China on Taiwan.
That same year, Indonesia joined Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to form a new regional and
officially nonaligned grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was friendly to the West.
March 1964
The western block's intimidating attempts to force Sukarno's cooperation,
cutting off aid
when he preferred a neutralist stand over a western alliance, inevitably led to closer relations
with countries like the Soviet Union and China who
stood ready to replace western aid.
The antagonistic and treacherous
treatment by the US and its Western allies led Sukarno
to accept assistance from a.o. Russia and China for which the West branded him a
communist. Sukarno declined the communist accusation and stressed that he worked
for the interest of his people and his fatherland. Under all circumstances he remained
a staunch nationalist, unwilling to become any one's satellite.
I am not solely nationalist,
I am not solely religionist,
I am not solely socialist,
I am a distillation of these three things .......
In my political outlook I am nationalist,
in my religious outlook I am Theist, I completely believe in God,
in my social outlook I am socialist
I am not a communist,
I am not a satellite of any nation in the world,
I work hard and sacrifice myself for the good of
my people and my beloved fatherland
Indonesia had the extraordinary luck, nothing
would have predicted that Indonesia at the
beginning of the 20th century would produce the man called Sukarno who, whatever
his many weaknesses (and there are indeed a great many), was in many ways the person
most responsible, by his tireless rhetoric and by his commitment in fact, to the national idea
of the solidarity of Indonesians as people, and brought into being the reality of Indonesian
nationalism which remains a powerful force even till today.
Those of us who study the history of U.S. relations with Indonesia know this relationship is
so rich and important that we are continually surprised that few people have explored it.
Each new monograph adds considerably to the too-small stock of knowledge. Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg's
study of the U.S.-Indonesian-Dutch relationship from 1920 to 1950 provides an informative and often revealing complement
to the classic standards. The heart of the book is an in-depth exploration of the U.S. reaction to the Indonesian
struggle, during 1945–1949, finally to win independence. The two chapters devoted to the earlier period serve primarily
to explain the tenaciousness of American views of the Dutch as competent, efficient, and deserving colonial rulers
despite the changing circumstances after World War II.
s
The book challenges the view that during the
period 1945-1949, the American government and its foreign policymakers unequivocally backed the Indonesian Republic's
struggle for independence. The same view of America's political endorsement of Indonesians' quest for independence
continues to reverberate in the United States itself. On the basis of research in American, Indonesian, Dutch,
and Australian diplomatic records and in the archives of the United Nations, Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg describe
and analyze American visions of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia from the 1920s to December 1949, when the Netherlands
relinquished its sovereignty over the archipelago in southeast Asia to the United States of Indonesia. Their analysis
suggests that the American diplomatic establishment was not as ignorant of conditions in the Indonesian archipelago
as many Dutch people assumed, both before and after World War II.
They also chronicle the unfolding of America's steady but tactical backing of its Dutch ally until early 1949,
when U.S. assessments of the regions in the world where the Cold War might ignite into a 'Hot War' began to incorporate
the anti-colonial, nationalist struggles in Indonesia and Vietnam.
The basic premise for any approach to Indonesia
and strategy was the strategic importance of the
Indonesian-controlled areas. The population was at the
time the world’s fifth largest, and the location forced
all major trade routes between the Far East and points
west to pass through or near Indonesian territory.
The wealth of natural resources was enormous, and
included critical raw materials like oil, tin and rubber
The US had a number of strategic interests in Indonesian economy. A considerable amount of private
investments and exports from Indonesia involved US parties. In addition, the region’s trade routes that went through
Indonesia needed to be secure. Indonesian economy furthermore held a value of its own
as a key to political change. The exploit of economy as a key to political change evolved during 1961 and 1962
into an active and central part of US policy.39 Meanwhile, the US kept detailed intelligence
on the Indonesian economic development.
During the Indonesian war of freedom, US opponents of Indonesian freedom had argued that Indonesia was the "cork"
that kept the Netherlands floating. Since 20% of Dutch economy rested on incomes
from the Dutch East Indies, taking these incomes away from the Dutch would ruin the their economy.
Indonesia by the early 1960s was no longer the cork of any big economy, and definitely not the US one.
The main strategic value of Indonesian economy was in how it affected the Indonesian political situation
On 15 August 1945, as a result of the Potsdam
Conference that took place in July, responsibility for
the
reoccupation of the Netherlands Indies, then still for the greatest part occupied by Japanese forces, was
transferred from SWPA to SEAC.
The new division of tasks between the Allied Powers, together with the capitulation of Japan on the same day,
brought a definitive halt to the preparations for 'Operation OBOE', that had been planned by General MacArthur
for
the reconquest of the island of Java. It also prevented a more intensive US-involvement during the initial phases
of
the decolonization conflict in Indonesia. The US was represented in Batavia by Consul-General Walter A. Foote who, in November
1945, was returned to the post, he had held in pre-war years. In January 1948 he was succeeded by Charles Livengood,
who in October 1949 was replaced by J.D. Beam.
Photographs from the Army Signal Corps Collection in the U.S. National Archives.
Group photograph of the "Big Three" heads of government at Potsdam, Germany, circa 28 July -- 1 August
1945.
Those present are (from left to right):
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee;
U.S. President Harry S. Truman;
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.
The "Big Three" pose with their principal advisors, at Potsdam, Germany, circa 28 July -- 1 August 1945.
The three heads of government are (seated, left to right):
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee;
U.S. President Harry S. Truman;
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.
Standing behind them are (left ot right):
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Truman's Chief of Staff;
British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin;
U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes;
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.
On 16 July 1945, the "Big Three" leaders met at Potsdam, Germany, near Berlin. In this, the last of
the World War II heads of state conferences, President Truman, Soviet Premier Stalin and British Prime Ministers
Churchill and Atlee discussed post-war arrangements in Europe, frequently without agreement. Future moves in the
war against Japan were also covered. The meeting concluded early in the morning of 2 August.
One result of the conference was a 26 July joint proclamation by the U.S., Great Britain and China, the three main
powers then fighting Japan. This "Potsdam Declaration" described Japan's present perilous condition,
gave the terms for her surrender and stated the Allies' intentions concerning her postwar status. It ended with
an ultimatum: Japan must immediately agree to unconditionally surrender, or face "prompt and utter destruction".
Until mid-1947, the State Department followed a policy of low profile with regard to the Indonesian dispute. A
change was brought about by the First 'Politionele Actie', when the dispute
was brought to the attention of the Security Council of th
United Nations by the Governments of Australia and India. By providing the 'third' member in the UN-appointed Committee
of Good Offices, the US adopted a more active and ultimately decisive role in resolving the con?ict between the
Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands. The first US-member on GOC was Frank P. Graham, who was actively involved
in negotiations leading up to the Renville Agreement. In March 1948, he was succeeded by Coert Dubois and, in August
of that same year,
by Merle C. Cochran. As a member of the GOC (after January 1949, re-named the United Nations Commission for Indonesia),
the latter played a prominent role during the discussions that led up to the Round Table Conference in The Hague.
After the transfer of sovereignty, by the end of 1949, Cochran became the first ambassador of the US to the newly
independent Indonesian state.
For most of the 1950s, the US tried to maintain a neutral stand in the conflict between the
Netherlands and Indonesia
regarding the status of Western New Guinea. In 1957/1958, however, when Sukarno proclaimed his policy of
Guided Democracy and made more serious overtures towards China and the Soviet Union,
the US authorities for a while tended to support the anti-Sukarno forces, which seemed to imply some support for
the Netherlands in its stand on Western New Guinea. When Sukarno proved strong enough to hold his own, however,
a rapprochement between him and the US
materialized which resulted in a weakening of the Netherland's position. The US, for their part, tried to end the
dispute
anyhow by exerting pressure upon both parties.
In 1961, discussions began under the supervision of Elsworth Bunker, a US-diplomat put at the disposal of the UN.
These resulted in the New York Agreements of August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands which provided for
the transfer of Western New Guinea to a United Nations Transitory Authority on 1 October 1962 and eventually to
Indonesia
on 1 May 1963.
The best relations with the US existed during
the Kennedy presidency. Kennedy was able to
develop a good personal relationship. Sukarno
trusted him and was willing to work with him. Kennedy's death deeply affected Sukarno .
It was the start of increasingly deteriorating
relations with the US.
"Why did he have to die"
, Sukarno deplored
when he heard the tragic news.
Ambassador Howard Jones had played a
major role in improving relations between the two countries. He had won the friendship and trust of
Sukarno and convinced Kennedy of the importance
of good relations with Sukarno.
After Kennedy's death relations started to deteriorate reaching its
culmination with the appointment of Jones's successor Marshal Green July 1965.
Worst relations
Ambassador
Green
The worst relations developed in 1965 during the Marshall Green ambassadorship
Sukarno distrusted Ambassador Marshal Green because of his alleged
CIA background , delaying
approval of his ambassadorial appointment
for several months.
This distrust was subsequently supported with the documented actions of Green before and after the Gestapu
affair, detrimental to Sukarno's position, contributing to his downfall.
With regard to Indonesia,
Green regularly told Australian audiences that when
he was there in the mid-1960s: "we did what we had
to do and you'd better be glad we did because if we hadn't Asia would be a different place today"
("Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia", p244; "The CIA:
A Forgotten History" by William Blum, Zed Books, 1986, p220)
Only months before the coup, U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green had arrived in Djakarta, bringing with him the reputation of having masterminded the student overthrow
of Syngman Rhee in Korea and sparking rumors that his purpose in Djakarta was to do the same there. Old manuals on student organizing in both Korean and English were supplied by the embassy
to KAMI's top leadership
soon after the coup.
Green's track record also includes
"direct experience of the CIA-sponsored replacement
of President Syngman Rhee by the military regime of Chung Hee Park" when he was a US Foreign Service Officer
in Seoul, South Korea, in 1960 ("Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia", p243).
Rhee resigned because of student-led disorder and
Peter Dale Scott suggests that one of Green's qualifications for
the Ambassador's post in Indonesia
in 1965 was his proven ability at fomenting violent student movements.
"Because
of the role of students in that eventual
military takeover [Park's coup], Green was widely
suspected in Indonesia of encouraging the student
activists in the post-coup purge of the PKI"
(ibid, p244).
Paul Lashmar and Jamese Oliver -- In autumn 1965, Norman Reddaway, a lean and erudite rising star of the Foreign
Office, was briefed for a special mission. The British Ambassador to Indonesia, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, had just
visited London for discussions with the head of the Foreign Office, Joe Garner. Covert operations to under-mine
Sukarno, the troublesome and independently minded President of Indonesia, were not going well. Garner was persuaded
to send Reddaway, the FO's propaganda expert, to Indonesia. His task: to take on anti-Sukarno propaganda operations
run by the Foreign Office and M16. Garner gave Reddaway #100,000 in cash "to do anything I could do to get
rid of Sukarno", he says.
Reddaway thus joined the loose amalgam of groups from the Foreign Office, M16, the State Department and the CIA
in the Far East, all striving to depose Sukarno in diffuse and devious ways. For the next six months he and his
colleagues chipped away at Sukarno's regime, undermining his reputation and assisting his enemies in the army.
By March 1966 Sukarno's power base was in tatters and he was forced to hand over his presidential authority to
General Suharto, the head of the army, who was already running a campaign of mass murder against alleged communists.
According to Reddaway, the overthrow of Sukarno was one of the Foreign Office's "most successful" coups,
which they have kept a secret until now. The British intervention in Indonesia, alongside complimentary CIA operations,
shows how far the Foreign Office was prepared to go in intervening in other countries' affairs during the Cold
War. Indonesia was important both economically and strategically. In 1952 the US noted that if Indonesia fell out
of Western influence, neighbours such as Malaya might follow, resulting in the loss of the "principle world
source of natural rubber and tin and a producer of petroleum other strategically important commodities".
The Japanese occupation during the Second World War, which to the Indonesians amounted to another period of colonial
rule, had revitalised the nationalist movement which after the war, declared independence and assumed power. Ahmed
Sukarno became Indonesia's first president. Western concern regarding Sukarno's regime grew owing to the strength
of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI, which at its peak had a membership of over 10 million, the largest
communist party in the non-communist world. Concerns were not allayed by Sukarno's internal and external policies,
including nationalising Western assets and a governmental role for the PKI.
By the early Sixties Sukarno had become a major thorn in the side of both the British and
the Americans. They believed
there was a real danger that Indonesia would fall to the communists.
o balance the army's growing power, Sukarno aligned himself closer the PKI.
The first indication of British interest
in removing Sukarno appears in a CIA memorandum of 1962.
Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy agreed to "liquidate President Sukarno, depending
on the situation and available opportunities".
Hostility to Sukarno was intensified by Indonesian objections to the Malaysian Federation. Sukarno complained the
project
was "a neo-colonial plot, pointing out that the Federation was a project for Malayan expansionism and continuing
British influence in the region.
In 1963 his objections crystallised in his policy of Konfrontasi, a breaking off of all relations with Malaysia,
soon coupled
with low-level military intervention. A protracted border war began along the 700 milelong front in Borneo.
Harold MacMillan
Harold Wilson
According to Foreign Office sources the decision to get rid of Sukarno had been taken by Macmillan's
Conservative government and carried through during Wilson's 1964 Labour government.
The Foreign Office had worked in conjunction with their American counterparts on a plan to oust the turbulent Sukarno.
A covert operation and psychological warfare strategy was instigated, based at Phoenix Park in Singapore, the British
headquarters in the region. The M16 team kept close links with key elements in the Indonesian army through the
British Embassy. One of these was Ali Murtopo, later General Suharto's intelligence chief, and M16 officers constantly
travelled back and forth between Singapore and Jakarta.
The Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) also worked out of Phoenix Park reinforcing the work
of Mi6 and the military psychological warfare experts.
IRD had been established by the Labour government in 1948 to conduct an anti-communist propaganda war against the
Soviets, but had swiftly become enlisted in various anti-independence movement operations in the declining British
Empire.
By the Sixties, IRD had a staff of around 400 in London and in-formation officers around the world influencing
media coverage
in areas of British interest.
According to Roland Challis, the BBC correspondent at the time in Singapore, journalists were open to manipulation
by IRD, owing, ironically, to Sukarno's own policies: "In a curious way, by keeping correspondents out of
the country Sukarno made them the victims of official channels, because almost the only information you could get
was from the British ambassador in Jakarta." The opportunity to isolate Sukarno and the PKI came in October
1965 when an alleged PKI coup attempt was the pretext for the army to sideline Sukarno and eradicate the PKI. Who
exactly instigated the coup and for what purposes remains a matter of speculation. However, within days the coup
had been crushed and the army was firmly in control. Suharto accused the PKI of being behind the coup and set about
suppressing them.
Following the attempted coup Britain set about exploiting the situation. On 5 October, Alec Adams, political adviser
to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, advised the Foreign Office: "We should have no hesitation in doing what
we can
surreptitiously to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia." The Foreign Office
agreed and suggested "suitable propaganda themes" such as PKI atrocities and Chinese intervention.
One of the main themes pursued by IRD was the threat posed by the PKI and "Chinese communists". Newspaper
reports continually emphasised the danger of the PKI. Drawing upon their experience in Malaya in the Fifties, the
British emphasised the Chinese nature of the communist threat. Roland Challis said: "One of the more successful
things which the West wished on to the non- communist politicians in Indonesia was to transfer the whole idea of
communism onto the Chinese minority in Indonesia. It turned it into an ethnic thing. It is a terrible thing to
have done to incite the Indonesians to rise and slaughter the Chinese."
But it was the involvement of Sukarno with the PKI in the bloody months following the coup that was to be the British
trump card. According to Reddaway: "The communist leader, Aidit, went on the run and Sukarno, being a great
politician, went to
the front of the palace and said that the communist leader Aidit must be hunted down and brought to justice. From
the side door of the palace, he was dealing with him every day by courier."
This information was revealed by the signal intelligence of Britain's GCHQ. The Indonesians didn't have a clue
about radio silence and this double-dealing was picked up by GCHQ; the British had its main eavesdropping base
in Hong Kong tuned
into events in Indonesia.
The discrediting of Sukarno was of fundamental importance. Sukarno remained a respected and
popular leader against
whom Suharto could not move openly until the conditions were right. The constant barrage of bad international coverage
and Sukarno's plummeting political position fatally undermined him. On 10 March (sic - 11 March) 1966, Sukarno
was forced
to sign over his powers to General Suharto. Now perceived as closely associated with the attempted coup and the
PKI,
Sukarno had been discredited to the point where the army felt able to act. The PKI was eliminated as a significant
force and
a pro-Western military dictatorship firmly established.
It was not long before Suharto quietly ended the inactive policy of Konfrontasi resulting
in a swift improvement in Anglo- Indonesian relations,
which continue to be close to this day.
From: 'Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-77', by Paul Lashmar and James Oliver
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