Home Introduction Background Conspiracy Data Military Family    Contact Us      Sukarno Years                  February 1966       February 1966   The story of the sudden death of an Indonesian officer, a respected military leader, dedicated to country, military discipline and family. Lt General (KKO) Hartono His unexplained death shrouded in mystery Three leading Navy officers of the Sukarno government died sudden deaths after Sukarno fell into disgrace and Suharto took over.   Sukarno was a "thorn in the eye" of the West because of his neutralist stand, unwilling to side with the West. The US wanted to control Indonesian strategic waterways connecting the Indian and Pacific Ocean. It was preferred above the Malacca Sraits because of its greater depth and certain lanes had high salinity allowing undersea vessels to travel undetected.   Sukarno held control over its passage and was herein supported by his Maritime commanders Martadinata, Muljadi and Hartono. The US did not have the free passage it wanted.   The removal of Sukarno as President and the death of each of the above named Navy leaders provided the US with the desired vital unllimited maritime passage between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. Circumstantial?? Coincidental?? Planned strategy?? Indonesian Navy circles believe there was an international conspiracy to have the Maritime commanders eliminated after Sukarno's removal from power to a.o. obtain this control over Indonesian waterways and also diminish the country's recognized maritime power.
President Sukarno March 11, 1966 Transfer of power to Suharto         Date of death Cause of death Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Martadinata 6 October 1966 Unexplained Helicopter crash in clear daylight near the Puncak Pass Ex Marine Corps Commander Lt GeneralHartono 6 January 1971 Official version - suicide Disputed; No Visa et repertum available Ex Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muljadi 2 August 1972 Reportedly due to heart attack
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February 1966
Indonesia Archipelagic Concept - Wawasan Nusantara 1957 The Djuanda declaration of 1957 was issued by Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawijaja to the efffect that the colonial ordinance was being shelved in favour of a completely new territorial model. In this declaration the Prime Minister asserted the new approach: The government declares that all waters surrounding the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefre, parts of the internal or national waters whcih are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state...The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia. 1960 The Djuanda Declaration was finally ratified by Legislative/Assembly with the enactment of Act No.4 regarding Indonesian Waters on February 18, 1960, thus finally formalizing a new territorial structure which in 1957 was merely a political declaration short of legal force. The bill expanded Indonesia's overall territory by about 2.5-fold, from 2,027,087 sqkm to 5,193,250 sqkm. With the exception of the land area of West Irian, the bulk of the newly-claimed territory involved the maritime area within the Indonesian archipelago. Furthermore, the new territorial configuration consisted of 196 straight baselines, which formed a circumference around the Indonesian islands and which amounted to 8,069.8 nautical miles in overal length (Kusumaatmadja, 1982.2) 1961 Ratification of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 1962 Enactment of the Act on Innocent Passage of 1962 on July 28, 1962. The Act deals with navigational conduct and establishes the operational criteria by which to determine the "innocent" character of maritime passge through its waters. It also contains regulations which must be obliged by foreign ships intending innocent passage. The phrase "innocent passage", however is fundamentally different from the principle of "navigational freedome" as found in the high sea. Innocent passage is granted so long as it does not pose a threat to Indonesia's "security, public order, interest and/or the peace of the Republic of Indonesia The Archipelagic State Concept, or Wawasan Nusantara, maintains that not only the land but all the waters between the islands are under the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, including the seabed and subsoil, as well as the air space. This concept of territorial rights represented a radical departure from traditional maritime law, which only recognized jurisdiction three miles from the shore of any island. All the marine areas beyond were traditionally considered international high seas to be exploited by any party for any purpose. After Suharto replaced Sukarno trade routes thru Indonesian waterways were opened, the 7th Fleet had undisputed use of thoroughfares thru Indonesian waterways from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Vital maritime passage between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean had been secured for both military and commercial purposes.
Sudden Deaths of Maritime leaders in the Sukarno government. Coincidence or Fate? In the years after the Gestapu Indonesia lost 3 leaders of the Indonesia Navy in a relatively short time frame under questionable circumstances. MaritimeVision as President Sukarno the vision that as a maritime nation uniting thousands of islands at a strategic world locationpreservation of the life and welfare of the country should be based on the premises that the surrounding surrounding waters, oceans and seas must be considered as: The base of the unification of the Indonesia nation The source and place for development of trade, industrial and services activities The source for basic necessities including energy The basis for the nation's defense and security President Sukarno summarized the Maritime Vision in his opening speech at the 1963 National Maritime Convention as follows: 1. Our country can only be strong if it is capable of controlling the surrounding seas 2. We should realize that our country cannot be strong, safe and secure if we do not control the surrounding seas and do not develop again and remain a seafaring nation. The Maritime Vision as promoted by President Soekarno was not endorsed by the western nations engaged in the Cold War. They did not want a country with the strategic importance of Indonesia to fall into communist hands. Neither did they did want Indonesia to become a too strong political power. They needed Indonesia's alliance including control of its waterways connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a control that was not endorsed by Indonesia's Maritime Vision. The suppporters of this Maritime Vision, President Sukarno and the Navy Command stood in the way of the Western ambitions. Is it coincidence that one after another they disappeared from the Indonesian government scene and died sudden deaths? A coincidence that yielded overnight improvement in the US ambition to control Indonesian waterways? President Sukarno, a strong nationalist and neutralist was skillfully but treacherously replaced by President Suharto who widely opened the doors to the West and a.o. gave them the desired unlimited passage thru Indonesian waterways. The Western countries may or may not have been directly instrumental in those sudden deaths. But their political strategies and ambitions certainly played a role in it.
Indonesia and the United States: Shared Interests in Maritime Security Under Indonesian law, “the Navy has responsibility for a lot of things besides just going to war. ”In fact, the Navy has both “war fighting” and “law enforcement” functions, though it shares the latter with several other Indonesian agencies.
U.S. Navy Stresses Need to Keep Southeast Asian Sea Lanes Open March 19, 1997 By EDUARDO LACHICA Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON -- The U.S. government needs to commit itself to keeping Southeast Asia's strategic sea lanes open to commercial ships, a U.S. navy-sponsored study says. That's because closure of Southeast Asia's strategic waterways for an extended period could seriously harm Asian economies with which the U.S. has important trading links. The study is the U.S. defense community's first hard look at the economic consequences of the possible disruption of merchant shipping in the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and in the disputed waters around the Spratly Islands. Protecting these sea lanes for economic reasons should become "as important a national priority as protecting them for military reasons," says John Noer, the head of a Center for Naval Analyses team that produced this extensively researched work. The study also concludes that Japan and other Asian countries that depend heavily on seaborne trade should assume more of the burden of keeping these waterways open. Heavy Traffic An enormous amount of trade flows through these sea lanes. In 1993, boats passing through carried $568 billion of cargo, or more than 15% of the world's cross-border trade, not counting a still unmeasurable volume of intraregional shipping that also uses these routes, the study says. The CNA team reports that in 1993 alone 1,121 supertankers with cargoes valued at $35.3 billion sailed eastward through the Malacca strait, headed mostly for Japan and other Northeast Asian economies. Since more than half of the world's registered tonnage transits these sea lanes, a local maritime contingency can quickly turn into a "globalized economic event," says Mr. Noer. The study notes that these chokepoints can be effectively closed even without being physically or militarily blockaded. If the Spratly waters are declared a war zone, for instance, shippers would be compelled by prohibitively high insurance rates to reroute their cargoes through the Sunda, Lombok or Makassar straits at higher shipping costs. The "worst case" that the study envisions is the shutdown of all four strategic waterways as a result of regional conflict or a failure of international freedom-of-navigation conventions. Such an eventuality would require a detour of oil and other bulk shipments to a much longer route around the southern coast of Australia. Impact on Japan The shipping industry would be the only winner if such a disruption occurs. Most of the world's idle vessels would have to be called back into service and freight rates might rise by as much as 500%, the study says, Japan would be among the hardest hit. Some 42% of its (two-way) maritime trade with a combined value of $255 billion passed these waterways in 1993. And if Japan's supplies of crude and liquefied natural gas from the Persian Gulf have to be diverted around Australia, as much as $1.5 billion would have to be added to its shipping costs alone, the study says. Japan also has a major stake in these routes as a ship-owning nation. In 1993, it owned 27.6% of the tonnage that passed through the Malacca strait, or four times more than any other nation, the study says. The next largest owners of this tonnage were Greece, the U.S., Britain and Singapore. Many of these vessels carried Panamanian, Liberian or other flags of convenience. Southeast Asian countries also could be severely affected by an interruption of normal traffic. Some 55.4% of the maritime exports of the region moved through these sea lanes in 1993. Singapore in particular could be badly hurt since the indefinite closure of these sea lanes would also have the effect of shutting down or severely reducing its port and oil-refining operations. Australia's trade likewise would suffer since nearly 40% of its exports and 53% of its imports move through these routes. Even with less than 4% of its maritime shipments dependent on these sea lanes, the U.S. still has a vital economic stake in keeping them open. "Our own prosperity is linked to the economic health of those Asian countries," Mr. Noer says. American consumers are bound to feel some pain, too, as rising freight rates world-wide makes imported goods more expensive. U.S. Navy's Role The study is circulating among the U.S. navy brass amid an intense review of post-Cold War roles and missions. Some navy planners want to shift more resources toward "littoral," or close-to-shore operations in support of ground troops, but the CNA study may justify a continuing sea lane protection role for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The study recommends exercises among "cooperating navies" to practice escorting merchant fleets through alternate routes in the event of the closure of the Malacca strait or the Spratly passages. It also calls attention to problems of maritime safety in that strait which is dangerously shallow and narrow in places. Malaysia and Indonesia have sought voluntary contributions to improve navigational and safety aids, but aren't getting an adequate response from Japanese and other shipowners, according to the study. The competing claims of navigational safety, national sovereignty and the freedom-of-navigation principle are yet to be fully resolved, Mr. Noer says. The study does cite one "stabilizing" factor. The countries most capable of defending or closing these sea lanes also have strong economic reasons for keeping them open. For instance, China's military actions could make the Spratly route effectively impassable for maritime traffic but such actions also would put at risk some $31 billion in annual Chinese trade with other countries.
February 1966 President Sukarno and Maritime Leaders
Indonesia waterways and its political implications. The mystery surrounding Hartono's decease has given rise to various interpretations seeking a reason for his death. Political reasons are strongly suspected. Marine and perhaps other circles have started viewing it in a broader context, linking it to an international conspiracy aimed at control of strategic Indonesian waterways conflicting with the Maritime View, and the untimely death of the then 3 leading Navy/Marines commanders, Admiral R.E. Martadinata, (1966), Lt General KKO Hartono (January 1971) and Admiral Muljadi (1972 ) who all died under questionable circumstances. In researching the circumstances surrounding Hartono's death I found facts and opinions leading to political motivations linking his death to an international conspiracy aimed at a.o. controlling vital Indonesian waterways in the Cold War context. Internationally Indonesia has an important strategic location. Its waterways provide the shortest connection between the Indian and Pacific Ocean. It has been long the centre of a power struggle between East and West to control the region. The US and its allies need the waterways for political, military and economic reasons. Japan uses the lanes for its supertankers, a lifeblood for the country. The Wetar Sealane , East of Timor near the Alor and Wetar islands is the only waterway suitable for travel of nuclear undersea vessels from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean, a.o. used by the US Atlantis. The high salinity level of the water enables undersea vessels to travel undetected. US and its allies have always endeavored to control the waterways. However, relations with the Sukarno government started weakening since 1955 when Sukarno convened the AA conference, proclaiming neutrality and independence from Western "imperialism". In 1957 the US supported an anti-Sukarno uprising in Sumatra (PRRI) and Minahasa (Permesta). The uprising was unsuccesful. and apparently the search was started for a more compliant successor.. The confrontational situation escalated when in 1962 Sukarno withdrew the country from the UN membership. The US and its allies could not tolerate a situation where they did not have control over Sukarno's actions. Sukarno was branded a communist and his communist relations overstated. Sukarno was not a communist. He was a nationalist, did not want to become a slave of imperialism, and advocated political independence. His ability to bring 29 countries together in the 1955 AA conference in Bandung, his Nekolim and New Emerging Forces concepts all aimed at establishing political independence from imperialism conflicted with the Western ambitions. Apparently a successor, more willing to cooperate had been identified. The 1965 Gestapu affair resulted in the removal of Sukarno as president , placing Suharto in the leadership position. Relations with the West improved overnight, obstacles to improved relations were skillfully removed. One major obstacle however continued to exist. The Maritime Vision, the basic policy adhered to by the Naval Command, guiding their policies, uphholding the doctrine that as a maritime nation Indonesia has to be able to control the seas surrounding them, including the inter-insular waterways. The Maritime leaders supporting this Vision remained an obstacle. Diminished Maritime Power. The loss of the supporters of the Indonesian Maritime Vision had negatively impacted the country'smaritime power. The first one to go was President Sukarno as a result of the infamous Gestapu (September 30 movement). A replacement had been identified and developed. Suharto became president and opened the way for the West to realize their political and economic ambitions. However, three Navy commanders still prevented Western control of strategic Indonesian waters. All three died in a relatively short time frame under suspicious/questionable circumstances. Octoberr 1966 - Navy Chief of Staff Admiral R.E. Martadinata died in a questionable helicopter crash in the Puncak area. January 1971 - Lt General (Marines) Hartono, ex Marines Commander and Deputy Navy Chief of Staff in the Sukarno years, died under suspicious circumstances. The official government version was that he committed suicide. His Marine collegues and family are convinced he was murdered and there are several factors supporting this conviction. August 1972 - Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Mueljadi, successor of Admiral Martadinata, died suddenly, reportedly from a heart attack. Coincidence??? With their death the Maritime Vision principles faded. The US, the dominant power in the Pacific. won their coveted control of strategic Indonesian waterways . The country's maritime power deteriorated. Indonesia's maritime strength ranking it as the most powerful maritime nation in South Asia diminished. This suited the ambitions of the Western Block who feared Indonesia for the following reasons: 1. Could become communist as per the domino theory 2. Possessed the largest communist party with approx. 40 million followers 3. President Sukarno's strong leadership position as a forefighter of neutralism, anti-imperialism and neo-colonialism. The Gestapu movement resulted in the fall of Sukarno. After Suharto replaced Sukarno trade routes thru Indonesian waterways were opened, the 7th Fleet had undisputed use of thoroughfares thru Indonesian waterways from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Vital maritime passage between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean had been secured for both military and commercial purposes. Questions arise as to what will be the future of Indonesia's strategic waterways, connecting the Indian and Pacific Ocean, now providing unlimited passage to US and other Western vessels. Selat Wetar, a small street east of Timor near the islands of Alor and Wetar is favorable for travel by undersea nuclear vessels traveling from the Indiand Ocean to the Paific Ocean. Its high salinity level prevents detection. What will be the fate of the Lombok and Makassar straits, used by Japanese super oil tankers, lifeblood of Japan? Can Indonesia re-instate the principles of the Maritime Vision or will the country forever lose control of its strategic waterways to foreign powers as happened with the Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Cape Hope, Malvinas, Malacca Straits?   A strategic move P.S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore The U.S. decision to help Indonesia "modernise" its military establishment is a strategic move that may acquire unforeseen importance in 2006. MANDEL NGAN/AFP U.S. President George W. Bush. MARITIME security is being cited by the United States as a "joint objective" that deserves to be pursued in association with Indonesia, among a few others, in East Asia. In fact, "maritime security" has been bracketed with "counter-terrorism" and "disaster relief" in a new catalogue of reasons for strategic cooperation between Washington and Jakarta. To be sure, the U.S. has not formally identified Indonesia as a strategic ally or partner in East Asia. However, the U.S. decision on November 22, 2005, to help Indonesia "modernise" its military establishment (TNI in local parlance) was a strategic move which, in the reckoning of regional diplomats and analysts, may acquire unforeseen importance in 2006. However, if no definitive diplomatic bets are being placed yet on such a possibility, the reasons have much to do with Indonesia's slow-paced resurgence as a democracy that could also stay stable over the longer term. Another factor of uncertainty has to do with the durability of America's attention span in regard to Indonesia in this context. Relevant to this aspect is Washington's growing strategic dependence on China to resolve the issues relating to the nuclear-weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the East Asian theatre itself. What is reasonably clear, despite such ifs and buts, is the U.S. move to try and coopt Indonesia for a policy of creating a second line of China containment. With the U.S. having updated and reinforced its long established military alliance with Japan in October 2005 (Frontline, August 12, 2005), the main strategic battle-lines were indeed firmed up for Washington's bid to prevent China from emerging as a peer-competitor in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is obviously scouting for more friends and allies for a potential global-scale containment of China over a longer term. India does figure in such a U.S. calculus, but that is a different story. From the U.S perspective, the control of key sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific zone is essential, for two sets of reasons. There is the more obvious objective of "counter-terrorism" and anti-piracy operations in the current global milieu of political priorities. But, there is also the discernible U.S. objective of keeping an eye on China, itself a growing maritime power. Now, the strategic importance of Indonesia, the world's largest archipelago-state that straddles important sea lanes, has not been missed by the U.S., long schooled in the `thoughts' of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a `guru' who advocated maritime supremacy as a defining aspect of American power. Indonesia, surely, has a long way to go before its potential as a major maritime power can be realised. However, when the U.S. decided to help it "modernise" the TNI, the naval angle was kept in prime focus, "maritime security" being projected as a "joint objective". There is an often downplayed, or even ignored, reason why Indonesia is particularly important for a global maritime player like the U.S. The Straits of Malacca in South-East Asia is arguably the busiest sea lane for global trade and it covers, at once, the interests of major economic powerhouses like the U.S., Japan, and China. It and the adjoining Straits of Singapore have been increasingly identified as potential terrorist targets in view of their enormous economic importance to the U.S. and its friends and allies. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In this context, the maritime passageways that crisscross the Indonesian archipelago can, if suitably developed, serve as an alternative to the Straits of Malacca. The economic viability of such a project may not have been worked out by the governments concerned. However, the political attractiveness of an alternative global trade route across South-East Asia remains a compelling proposition. A counter-point, obviously, is whether Indonesia, which is increasingly seen as a fertile territory for Al Qaeda and its "regional affiliate", the Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.), can indeed provide a safe alternative route for global trade. It is in this subtext that the U.S. reasoning for helping Indonesia "modernise" the TNI makes interesting reading. The ongoing democratisation of the Indonesian polity and its current emergence as "a voice of moderation in the Islamic world", under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have been outlined in justification of the U.S. move to befriend the TNI and help Jakarta beef up its military muscle. As for U.S. appreciation of Indonesia's undeniable democratisation at this stage, the political irony is that Washington's hands are not clean insofar as the political evolution of this South-East Asian country is concerned. It is widely chronicled that the U.S. had aided the process of toppling a democratically elected government in Indonesia in the 1950s. This does not, however, cast a slur on Indonesia's current efforts to energise itself as a resurgent democracy. Equally important is the U.S.' latest certification of Indonesia's moderation as the world's largest Muslim majority country. At one level, the recent terrorist strike in the Indonesian holiday resort of Bali, the second such major attack there in about four years, has served as a grim reminder of the challenges that Jakarta still faces on this front. At another, President Yudhoyono has reassured the international community of his political resolve to ensure that the terrorists do not fly under the radar. Significant, against this backdrop, are the difficulties that Indonesia has encountered in securing the full cooperation of the U.S. for anti-terror preparedness. Washington's sense of proprietary prerogative in investigating Hambali, an Indonesian national and a suspected top leader of the J.I., is illustrative of these difficulties. Hambali was caught in Thailand under a U.S.-led anti-terror operation in 2003. Given these realities, the U.S. reasoning for moving closer to Indonesia has at least as much to do with its democratic polity and moderation in the Islamic world as with other and strategic considerations. With the TNI having been the target of much U.S. criticism over the years and with Indonesia having come under the U.S.' military-related sanctions in the past, the latest American move has a clear strategic thrust of the lift-off kind. The strategic scene is not complicated, though. In 2004, the U.S. came up with the idea that a regional maritime security initiative (RMSI) be implemented to safeguard the shipping lanes of the Straits of Malacca. The proposal sparked instant resistance from Malaysia and also Indonesia which, along with Singapore, constitute the littoral domain of the Straits of Malacca. The opposition from Indonesia and Malaysia (Frontline, July 1, 2005) was based on the reasoning that there was no justification to jettison the principle of national sovereignty over maritime zones in order to allow the formidable U.S. Navy a free run of the Straits of Malacca. The U.S. counter-argument was that the narrow waterway, as an international shipping route, had no sovereign maritime zones at all. The resistance to the RMSI prompted much thinking about suitable alternatives, although the U.S. never really gave up the idea altogether. As a result, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have, for some time now, resorted to "coordinated patrolling" of the Straits of Malacca. This is entirely in harmony with the principle of national sovereignty of the littoral states. In August 2005, the littoral states initiated the "Eyes in the Sky" project to supplement the coordinated naval patrolling. Essentially a "maritime air patrol", the project was extended by the littorals to Thailand, which falls within their geopolitical neighbourhood. It is in this context of proactive patrolling of the Straits of Malacca by the local players that the U.S. has now wooed Indonesia, a key littoral state, whose President, formerly a TNI chief, had undergone military training at American facilities during his non-civilian career. Yudhoyono has not so far emerged as an Indonesian Musharraf for American strategic purposes. Nor has the Indonesian leader indicated whether his country would be willing to play second fiddle to the U.S. in any future China-containment project. However, as a former military leader with Eisenhower-like ambitions, Yudhoyono knows the value of U.S. help for the TNI's modernisation. More significantly, Washington has made no secret of its intention to recruit Indonesia as a potential ally in these circumstances, and maritime security is an honourable proposition.
Summary. The deaths of Admiral Martadinata (October 1966), Lt General KKO Hartono (January 1971) and Admiral Muljadi (1972) is rumored to be part of an international conspiracy aimed at securing control of Indonesian waterways, a highly desired connection between the Indian and Pacific Ocean. Indonesia lost 3 Navy leaders in a row, Martadinata, Hartono, Muljadi. They had the same Maritime Vision as President Sukarno. Indonesia had been the strongest maritime force in South Asia. Was this part of an international conspiracy or just coincidence? A fact is that with their disappearance the country's Maritime Vision lost its strength and its Maritime Power greatly deteriorated. The United States, the dominant regional military power throughout the Pacific, wanted unlimited access to Indonesian straits which President Sukarno was not willing to provide. The Navy Command (first Martadinata-Hartono, then Muljadi-Hartono) supported Sukarno's Archipelagic Concept giving the country the right to control passage through its territorial waters. Sukarno was treacherously shoved aside in the context of the Gestapu Affair and replaced by Suharto, a proclaimed Cold War Ally. When Suharto took over power from Sukarno March 1966 the Navy Command still remained an obstacle to the US ambitions. Coincidence??? Martadinata died in a sudden helicopter crash in the Puncak area after Sukarno was replaced. Suharto eliminated Western fears that Indonesia would fall to communism by disbanding PKI followed by mass murder of members and socalled members helped by namelists provided by the US Embassy. Suharto then removed Hartono and Muljadi from their military power positions and placed them outside Indonesia as Ambassador. In 1969 Hartono was appointed Ambassador for North Korea and Muljadi Ambassor for the Sovjet Union. They died sudden deaths not long thereafter. USS Blue Ridge Flagship of the 7th Fleet Commissioned 14 November 1970 Indonesian waterways were opened, the US 7th Fleet had undisputed use of thoroughfares thru Indonesian waterways from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Vital maritime passage between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean had been secured by the US for both military and commercial purposes. 7F - US Seventh Fleet area of responsibility After this the Maritime Vision faded and the country's maritime power deteriorated gradually to the extent that it was no longer the strongest maritime force in South Asia. Declassified State Department documents show that the US apparently welcomed Suharto'splans to replace the Navy command as reflected in the March 15, 1967 communication from Ambassador Marshal Green to the State Department, in which he refers to the pending removal of Navy Minister/Chief of Staff Muljadi and KKO (Marine) Commander Hartono as follows: "Changes in top Navy and Police leadership is high on agenda. Suharto perhaps hopes that Navy Minister Muljadi, Marine Commandant Hartono and Police Minister Sutjipto will fall of their own weight once their underlings assess their failure to influence significantly outcome of MPRS session. After cooling off period, Suharto might personally take hand in their ouster and perhaps ask Adam Malik to cough up more Ambassadorial positions." Removal of Muljadi and Hartono from their commanding positions seems to have been of great US interest. Maintaining Maritime Mobility Excerpt. Even as the Cold War recedes, U.S. interests and reach will remain global for the foreseeable future. The definition of Navy missions set out in ...From the Sea reflects those interests, and includes a broad and challenging array of peacetime as well as conflict roles: presence, strategic deterrence, sea control, crisis response, power projection, sealift, embargoes, counternarcotics operations, and humanitarian operations. The capacity to perform these missions depends on maritime mobility--on free access to the world oceans, including strategic waterways and international straits. That access cannot be taken for granted. Protecting Economic Interests Commercial Navigation. The navigation provisions of the LOS Convention are important to the United States for economic as well as security reasons. As a major trading nation, the U.S. depends on access to shipping routes. The stability and predictability afforded by the Convention will serve to keep shipping costs low. Uncertainty regarding transit regimes costs time (longer routes) and money (insurance fees and fuel). For example, ships passing from Japan to the Middle East that were unable to pass through international straits controlled by Indonesia would be forced to re-route around Australia, adding 5,800 nautical miles and 15 days (assuming a speed of 15 knots) to their journey. Wetar Straits, a deep-water trough between the Indian and Pacific Oceans important for submarine passage, would be a vital sea 'choke point' in any future conflict.